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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BECKER, Chief Judge. 
 
I. Introduction 
 
This appeal by defendant Leonard Pelullo, arising out of 
his conviction at his fourth trial in the District Court for 
wire fraud and civil RICO violations, brings his case before 
this Court for the fourth time as well. See United States v. 
Pelullo, 964 F.2d 193 (3d Cir. 1992) ("Pelullo I"); United 
States v. Pelullo, 14 F.3d 881 (3d Cir. 1994) ("Pelullo II"); 
United States v. Pelullo, 105 F.3d 117 (3d Cir. 1997) 
("Pelullo III"). The appeal follows our remand in Pelullo III for 
the District Court to determine whether Pelullo would have 
testified at his first trial regardless of the government's 
Brady violations, which we identified in Pelullo II and Pelullo 
III. In remanding, we did not decide the quantum of the 
government's burden of proving that fact. The District 
Court concluded the burden was a preponderance of the 
evidence, though it went on to find by clear and convincing 
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evidence that the government's Brady violation did not 
cause Pelullo to testify. See United States v. Pelullo, 6 F. 
Supp. 2d 403 (E.D. Pa. 1998). 
 
We devote our attention in this appeal to two issues. 
First, we consider whether the District Court applied the 
correct standard of proof. Second, if the District Court 
applied the correct standard, we must decide whether it 
erred in concluding that the government successfully met 
its burden. We agree with the District Court that the proper 
standard of proof is preponderance of the evidence and that 
the government met this standard at the evidentiary 
hearing. Accordingly, we will affirm on these points. We 
dispose summarily of Pelullo's remaining contentions: (i) 
that the District Court should have recused itself; and (ii) 
that the District Court erred in changing Pelullo's sentence 
from two-year suspended sentences on forty-eight counts 
following the first trial to four-year active sentences on 
those counts following the fourth trial, finding these 
contentions patently lacking in merit.1  However, the 
government does not counter Pelullo's contention that the 
District Court erred in modifying Pelullo's sentence from a 
non-committed fine to a committed fine withoutfinding 
that he had the present ability to pay the fine. We agree. 
Therefore, when the mandate is returned to the District 
Court, the District Court shall amend the judgment to 
reflect that the fine is a non-committed fine. 
 
II. Facts and Procedural History 
 
The facts in this case have been set forth in detail in 
previous opinions, and hence we only set forth those facts 
necessary to decide the narrow issues before us. In 1991, 
Pelullo was indicted on 54 counts of wire fraud and one 
RICO count. The government alleged in Counts 1-53 that 
Pelullo, the CEO of a public company called Royale Group, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. With regard to the latter point, we note that because we are affirming 
Pelullo's conviction on Counts 1 and 55, which amount to a twenty-four 
year sentence, and because the District Court designated the four-year 
sentences to run concurrently with Counts 1 and 55, the change in the 
sentence has no practical effect on the time Pelullo will serve, as 
Pelullo 
now concedes. 
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engaged in two schemes to divert for his personal use 
money loaned to Royale that was to be used to refurbish 
several art deco hotels it owned in Miami. In Count 54 of 
the indictment, the government alleged a third, similar 
scheme: that Pelullo had diverted $114,000 from a Royale 
subsidiary to pay off part of a $250,000 loan that Anthony 
DiSalvo, a loan shark with purported ties to the 
Philadelphia Mafia, had made to him. The government's 
theory was that Pelullo submitted false documentation, 
including fabricated financing requests, that allowed Royale 
to obtain loan money in excess of the expenses it actually 
incurred and that Pelullo, as CEO, diverted the excess 
funds for his personal use. 
 
The government's case against Pelullo on Count 54 was 
based primarily on the testimony of two FBI agents, Randal 
Wolverton and Michael Leyden, and of an admitted mafia 
underboss named Philip Leonetti. Wolverton testified that 
Pelullo, in a June 14, 1990, interview with FBI agents 
(including Wolverton and Leyden), had admitted using the 
$114,000 to pay off DiSalvo. Leonetti testified that he met 
with Pelullo in January 1986 at the Florida home of 
Nicodemo Scarfo, who was Leonetti's uncle and the reputed 
boss of the Philadelphia mob, to tell Pelullo that he had to 
repay DiSalvo. In late February 1986, Pelullo wired 
$114,000 from a business bank account to his father's 
company (LRP, Inc.) in Philadelphia. One of Pelullo's 
brothers (Arthur) allegedly converted the wire transfer to 
cash and gave the cash to their other brother (Peter) to 
drop off at DiSalvo's home in Philadelphia. 
 
In response to this testimony, Pelullo took the stand and 
contradicted Wolverton's claim that Pelullo had admitted to 
using Royale funds to repay his DiSalvo debt. He claimed 
that he had not started to pay off the DiSalvo loan until 
August 1986 and that the $114,000 in question had been 
used to repay an intercompany debt in February. The jury, 
apparently unconvinced by that defense, convicted Pelullo 
of Count 54, 48 other counts of wire fraud, and the RICO 
count. We vacated this conviction as to every count but 
Count 54, which we affirmed. See Pelullo I, 964 F.2d at 
222. We vacated the other convictions because the 
government had failed to authenticate bank records. 
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The government subsequently corrected the error, and in 
1993, Pelullo was retried and convicted on all counts. 
Again, we vacated the entire conviction and remanded for 
retrial. See Pelullo II, 14 F.3d at 907. We concluded that the 
District Court had erred in instructing the jury that 
Pelullo's previous conviction on Count 54 conclusively 
established a RICO violation. See id. at 897. We also noted 
that the government had committed a Brady violation by 
failing to turn over an IRS memorandum detailing a 
meeting between IRS Agent James Kurtz and Leonetti, but 
we concluded that this violation did not affect the trial's 
outcome. See id. at 887. 
 
Prior to the third trial, the government gave Pelullo three 
more pieces of Brady evidence. The first piece was 
Wolverton's rough notes of the June 14, 1990, interview 
during which Pelullo discussed the $114,000 transaction. 
The notes included the words, "repaying intercompany 
debt." That statement appeared nowhere in the FBI's 302 
report, although it ostensibly corroborated Pelullo's defense. 
The second piece of Brady material was rough notes of 
Agent Kurtz's interview with Leonetti. Those notes 
referenced "summer 1986," although that date was not 
included in Kurtz's final memo. The third piece of material 
was the FBI surveillance log of Nicodemo Scarfo's Florida 
residence for January 1986. These logs do not list Pelullo 
as a visitor to the residence during that month. 
 
In his first two trials, Pelullo had taken the stand, but in 
his 1994 and 1995 trials he did not. In his 1994 trial, the 
District Court was forced to declare a mistrial when the 
jury failed to reach a verdict. In his fourth trial, although 
Pelullo did not testify in person, the government read a 
portion of his testimony from the first trial into the record. 
At the end of the fourth trial, in early 1995, the jury 
convicted Pelullo on 46 wire fraud counts and the RICO 
violation. 
 
Pelullo appealed from the judgment in the fourth trial, 
challenging his convictions on the 46 wire fraud counts and 
the RICO count, his sentence on those counts, and his 
earlier conviction on Count 54. With regard to his 
convictions following the fourth trial, Pelullo claimed that 
he had been forced to take the stand at the first trial solely 
 
                                5 
  
because the government had violated his constitutional 
rights by failing to meet its Brady obligation. Without the 
subsequently-revealed Brady evidence in hand, Pelullo 
argued, he had no other way to impeach the three 
government witnesses. He alleged that his testimony in the 
first trial was essentially "fruit from a poisonous tree" and 
that his testimony, read into the record at the fourth trial, 
tainted the fourth trial as well. 
 
We agreed that there had been a Brady violation relating 
to Count 542 but remanded to the District Court for an 
evidentiary hearing. See Pelullo III, 105 F.3d at 125. Inter 
alia, we held that the District Court had erred in allocating 
to Pelullo the burden of proof on the Brady issue and gave 
the government the opportunity to establish, in accordance 
with Harrison v. United States, 392 U.S. 219 (1968), that 
Pelullo would have testified in his first trial even if the 
government had complied with its Brady obligations. See 
Pelullo III, 105 F.3d at 126. If the government were unable 
to prove that Pelullo's testimony in his first trial was not 
prompted by its Brady violation, it would be problematic for 
the government to have used his testimony from thefirst 
trial as evidence in the fourth trial. In other words, the 
government had to prove that Pelullo's decision to testify at 
the first trial was not caused by the Brady violation. On 
remand, the District Court held a hearing and made 69 
findings of fact based on the evidence from the hearing, its 
review of the records of the first two trials, its observation 
of Pelullo's demeanor at all four trials, and its analysis of 
Pelullo's attorney's testimony about strategy at thefirst 
trial. It concluded that the government met its burden by 
clear and convincing evidence (i.e., by more than a 
preponderance). Pelullo appeals from this decision. 
 
The District Court's legal determination of the 
government's requisite standard of proof is subject to de 
novo review. See Polselli v. Nationwide Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 
23 F.3d 747, 750 (3d Cir. 1994). We review its factual 
findings about the effect of the Brady material on Pelullo's 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Accordingly, we reversed Pelullo's conviction from the first trial on 
Count 54, and that Count is not presently before us. See 105 F.3d at 
127. 
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trial strategy for clear error. See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 
131, 145 (1986); Campbell v. United States, 373 U.S. 487, 
493 (1963). A finding is " `clearly erroneous' when although 
there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the 
entire evidence is left with the definite andfirm conviction 
that a mistake has been committed." United States v. 
United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948). 
Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the 
factfinder's choice between them cannot be clearly 
erroneous. See Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 
564, 574 (1985). Our review of the sufficiency of the district 
court's findings of fact on the sentencing issue is plenary. 
See United States v. Seale, 20 F.3d 1279, 1284 (3d Cir. 
1994). 
 
III. Discussion 
 
A. Standard of Proof 
 
We must first decide whether the District Court correctly 
required the government to meet its evidentiary burden by 
only a preponderance of the evidence or whether, as Pelullo 
urges, the Court should have required the government to 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Pelullo would have 
testified at his first trial even if he possessed all of the later- 
disclosed Brady material. While we made clear in Pelullo III 
that a defendant's testimony may be subject to suppression 
if compelled by a Brady violation, we did not direct the 
District Court to apply a particular standard of proof when 
we remanded for the evidentiary hearing. Instead, we 
stated: 
 
       [B]ecause the district court misallocated the burden of 
       proof under Harrison [v. United States, 392 U.S. 219 
       (1968)], we vacate the district court's denial of Pelullo's 
       Rule 33 motion for a new trial and remand for a new 
       hearing on that motion consistent with this opinion. 
       On remand, the government should be afforded an 
       opportunity to demonstrate, consistent with its burden 
       of proof, that Pelullo would have testified during his 
       first trial even if the withheld material had been turned 
       over. 
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Pelullo III, 105 F.3d at 126. 
 
As instructed, the District Court looked to Harrison for 
guidance. In Harrison, the Supreme Court decided that a 
defendant's trial testimony must be excluded if that 
testimony is "impelled by the prosecution's wrongful use of 
his illegally obtained confessions." 392 U.S. at 224. In 
allocating the burden of proof, the Supreme Court 
reasoned, "Having `released the spring' by using the 
petitioner's unlawfully obtained confessions against him, 
the Government must show that its illegal action did not 
induce his testimony." Id. at 225. The Court did not, 
however, articulate what standard of proof applies to the 
government's burden. 
 
At the evidentiary hearing, the government argued--and 
the District Court implicitly accepted--that Harrison was an 
exclusionary rule case and that the proper standard under 
such an inquiry is a preponderance of the evidence 
standard. The Court reasoned that the Supreme Court has 
applied a preponderance standard when the government 
has the burden of showing that evidence is not tainted by, 
or did not flow directly from, a constitutional violation and 
is therefore not subject to suppression under the 
exclusionary rule. Pelullo disputes the characterization of 
Harrison as an exclusionary rule case, contending that the 
government should face a "beyond a reasonable doubt" 
standard because Harrison cites Chapman v. California, 386 
U.S. 18 (1966), which held that "before a federal 
constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must 
be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt." 386 U.S. at 24. As will be discussed 
below, Pelullo misunderstands the import of Harrison and 
the nature of the evidentiary hearing at issue in this case. 
 
The exclusionary rule mandates that evidence derived 
from constitutional violations may not be used at trial 
because illegally derived evidence is considered "fruit of the 
poisonous tree." Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 
487-88 (1963). The Supreme Court in Wong Sun explained 
that it is important to determine whether the derived 
evidence came directly from the exploitation of the 
constitutional violation or whether the derived evidence was 
obtained "by means sufficiently distinguishable to be 
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purged of the primary taint." Id. at 488. The exclusionary 
rule serves to deter constitutional violations by denying the 
government the benefit of those violations, and accordingly, 
"the application of the rule has been restricted to those 
areas where its remedial objectives are thought most 
efficaciously served." Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 
804 (1984). 
 
Courts have developed a number of exceptions to the 
exclusionary rule, including the independent source, 
inevitable discovery, and attenuation doctrines, and a good 
faith exception. See, e.g., Segura, 468 U.S. at 805 
(independent source); Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 441-44 
(1984) (inevitable discovery); Nardone v. United States, 308 
U.S. 338, 341 (1939) (attenuation); Arizona v. Evans, 514 
U.S. 1, 14 (1995) (good faith). The independent source, 
inevitable discovery, and attenuation doctrines recognize 
that where the causal link between the constitutional 
violation and later-revealed evidence is tenuous or, indeed, 
non-existent, the later-revealed evidence can be said to be 
untarnished by the constitutional violation and therefore 
may be admissible. 
 
The Harrison Court recognized the importance of 
examining that causal link to determine whether the 
government's use of a defendant's illegal confession at trial 
induced the defendant to take the stand to testify and, in 
doing so, make a number of admissions that might not 
have come out but for that testimony. See Harrison, 392 
U.S. at 224-25. While acknowledging that a number of 
factors inevitably play a part in a defendant's decision to 
testify, the Court concluded that the government had failed 
to prove that the defendant's testimony was obtained by 
means sufficiently distinguishable from the underlying 
constitutional violation. See id. at 225-26. We believe the 
Court in Harrison mandated what is essentially an 
exclusionary rule inquiry where there appears to be a link 
between a constitutional violation and a defendant's 
subsequent decision to take the stand. 
 
Pelullo presses a "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard 
on us, based on Harrison's citations to Chapman.3 The 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Pelullo also makes much of the fact that Harrison cited People v. 
Spencer, 424 P.2d 715 (Cal. 1967). See Harrison, 392 U.S. at 225 n.12. 
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Chapman Court observed that as "the beneficiary of a 
constitutional error," the state must prove "beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not 
contribute to the verdict obtained." Chapman, 385 U.S. at 
24. This language has become commonplace in harmless 
error analyses. However, the issue in Harrison, and indeed 
at the evidentiary hearing, was whether the defendant's 
trial testimony was corrupted by an earlier constitutional 
violation; at no point had it been determined that the trial 
testimony itself was a constitutional violation to which a 
harmless error analysis might be applied. Critically, the 
inquiry in Harrison was a causation inquiry, not an inquiry 
into the effect of a constitutional violation on the verdict. 
 
In light of Harrison's exclusionary rule framework, and by 
virtue of the fact that Harrison did not explicitly set out the 
government's standard of proof, we look to other 
exclusionary rule cases for guidance on the proper 
standard of proof. Courts almost invariably have required 
the government to prove only by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the causal link between the constitutional 
violation and the later-revealed evidence is sufficiently weak 
or remote to merit admission of that evidence. For example, 
in Nix, the Supreme Court determined that the government 
must prove by a preponderance that the police would have 
inevitably discovered the victim's body without the help of 
an illegally obtained confession. See Nix, 467 U.S. at 444 
n.5. The Court was unwilling to impose a higher standard 
of proof because a higher standard would impose "added 
burdens on the already difficult task of proving guilt in 
criminal cases by enlarging the barrier to placing evidence 
of unquestioned truth before juries." See id.; see generally 
United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 177 n.14 (1974) 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
In Spencer, the Supreme Court of California held that the government 
had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not take 
the stand as a result of the government's use of an improper confession 
in court. See 424 P.2d at 724. But the Harrison Court gave no indication 
that it wished to adopt Spencer's standard of proof analysis, citing 
Spencer only for the proposition that the government bears the burden 
of disproving causation. We refuse to read more into the Court's decision 
to cite Spencer. 
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("[T]he controlling burden of proof at suppression hearings 
should impose no greater burden than proof by a 
preponderance of the evidence."); Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 
477, 488 (1972) ("[N]o substantial evidence has 
accumulated that federal rights have suffered from 
determining admissibility by a preponderance of the 
evidence."). 
 
Lower courts have followed the Supreme Court's lead, 
expanding the preponderance standard to the independent 
source doctrine and attenuation cases. The Tenth Circuit in 
United States v. Lin Lyn Trading, Ltd., 149 F.3d 1112, 1116 
(10th Cir. 1998), held that the government had to prove by 
a preponderance that the evidence in question came from 
an independent source or that the discovery of the evidence 
was so attenuated from the constitutional violation as to 
escape the violation's taint. Likewise, in United States v. 
Dudden, 65 F.3d 1461 (9th Cir. 1995), the Ninth Circuit 
concluded that if the government wished to use evidence 
against a defendant to whom it had granted statutory 
immunity without violating the Fifth Amendment, it had to 
prove by a preponderance that it had obtained that 
evidence from a source independent from the defendant's 
own testimony. See id. at 1468; see also United States v. 
Vasquez De Reyes, 149 F.3d 192, 195 (3d Cir. 1998) 
(requiring government to prove inevitable discovery by a 
preponderance);4 United States v. Griffin, 48 F.3d 1147, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. In Vasquez, we expressed concern about applying the inevitable 
discovery exception to testimonial evidence. However, in Vasquez, the 
defendant was illegally stopped by an INS agent who suspected that she 
was an illegal alien. After producing papers showing that she was 
married to a resident of the Virgin Islands, but after failing to show a 
visa, she was taken to a correctional facility. Her husband arrived at the 
facility and, after being questioned, revealed that their marriage was a 
sham. As a result, Mrs. Vasquez De Reyes confessed to the sham. She 
later filed a motion to suppress her statement based on the illegal nature 
of the original stop, but the district court found that the sham nature of 
the marriage would have inevitably been discovered through an INS 
investigation of her marriage when she applied to live in the U.S. On 
appeal, Vasquez De Reyes argued that there were too many variables to 
find that a routine INS investigation would have inevitably disclosed the 
sham. We agreed, noting that the statement that the government sought 
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1151 (10th Cir. 1995) (requiring government to prove by a 
preponderance its independent source and inevitable 
discovery theories); United States v. Bartel, 19 F.3d 1105, 
1112 (6th Cir. 1994) (requiring proof of independent source 
by preponderance). 
 
The purpose of the evidentiary hearing in the District 
Court was much like an exclusionary rule inquiry in which 
the government argues that it would have obtained the 
evidence anyway under the inevitable discovery or 
independent source doctrines. The government was given 
the chance to prove that Pelullo would have testified at the 
first trial--and the government would have thus "obtained" 
his testimony therefrom--even if Pelullo possessed all of the 
Brady material before the first trial. For the foregoing 
reasons, we agree with the District Court's conclusion that 
the government had to meet its burden by a preponderance 
of the evidence. 
 
B. The Government's Proof 
 
In light of our conclusion that the District Court held the 
government to the correct standard of proof at the 
evidentiary hearing, we must decide whether the District 
Court clearly erred in finding that the government had met 
its burden at the hearing. We hold that the District Court 
did not clearly err in concluding that the government 
established by a preponderance "that Pelullo's testimony at 
the first trial was obtained by means sufficiently 
distinguishable from the Brady violation to be purged of 
any taint arising from that violation." See Pelullo, 6 F. 
Supp. 2d at 413. We first review the general scheme of 
Count 54 and then address in detail the seven factual 
findings explicitly contested by Pelullo. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
to have admitted under the exception was a "statement not yet made," 
which by nature is not capable of ready verification. 149 F.3d at 195-96. 
In Pelullo's case, however, the issue is not what Pelullo would or would 
not have testified to, which clearly would require speculation, but 
whether he would have testified, which is a less speculative and more 
easily verifiable determination. 
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Count 54 of the indictment was based on a wire transfer 
made on February 26, 1986. Pelullo transferred $114,000 
from the account of Palm Beach Heights, a Royale 
subsidiary, to LRP, Inc., a company owned by Pelullo's 
father. The government alleged that Pelullo performed the 
wire transfer and used the transferred corporate funds to 
repay the money he had borrowed from DiSalvo. 
 
As proof of this diversion for personal use, the 
government relied first on Leonetti's testimony and IRS 
Agent Kurtz's notes from an interview with Leonetti. 
Leonetti testified that at the end of December 1985, DiSalvo 
asked him to help collect DiSalvo's loan to Pelullo. Leonetti 
then stated that he told Scarfo, his "boss," about DiSalvo's 
request, whereupon they contacted Pelullo in Florida. 
Leonetti testified that Pelullo came to Scarfo's house in 
Florida in January 1986, at which time they pressured him 
to repay the DiSalvo loan.5 The government sought to 
connect the timing of this meeting with the February wire 
transfer. The government also relied on Agents Wolverton's 
and Leyden's testimony. Both agents testified that Pelullo 
admitted, during the June 1990 interview with them, that 
he had used the $114,000 belonging to Palm Beach Heights 
to repay the DiSalvo debt. 
 
During his testimony about Count 54 at the first trial, 
Pelullo admitted that DiSalvo had lent him money, but 
denied that the $114,000 had been used to repay DiSalvo, 
or that he had told the agents that it had. Pelullo also 
denied ever meeting Leonetti, although he acknowledged 
that he knew who Leonetti was. He admitted going to 
Scarfo's house, but claimed that he went there to consult 
with a friend who was doing construction for Scarfo. 
Finally, Pelullo testified that he only began to repay the 
DiSalvo debt in August or September 1986, and that the 
loan was not fully paid off until 1987. The District Court 
made 69 findings of fact; we discuss only the seven 
contested findings, which provide the primary rationales for 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. The third piece of Brady material, the FBI surveillance logs of 
Scarfo's 
house, did not list Pelullo as a visitor to the house in January. However, 
the logs only covered twelve days in January, see Pelullo III, 105 F.3d at 
123 n.3, and thus appear to be of little help to Pelullo's case. 
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the District Court's conclusion that Pelullo would have 
testified even in the absence of a Brady violation. 
 
1. Propensity to Testify 
 
The District Court concluded that Pelullo's prior course of 
conduct established "a long history of voluntarily waiving 
his fifth amendment privilege." See United States v. Pelullo, 
6 F. Supp. 2d 403, 414 (E.D. Pa. 1998). The Court referred 
to a number of instances in which Pelullo had testified 
under oath or had voluntarily given interviews to the FBI 
about the subject matter of various indictments, including 
this one. While we are hesitant to conclude that someone 
has a "propensity" to testify, the District Court draws a 
number of valid inferences. From the situations in which 
Pelullo had waived his Fifth Amendment privilege, including 
an example where Pelullo testified and was acquitted, the 
Court inferred that "Mr. Pelullo believed he could persuade 
the jury that he was telling the truth." See id. The District 
Court also hypothesized that after testifying in his own 
defense in the first two trials and being convicted both 
times, Pelullo may have decided to change tactics in the 
third trial. See id. Pelullo tries to refute this conclusion by 
arguing that his behavior in the third and fourth trials (i.e., 
his decision not to testify there) shows that he does not 
have a propensity to testify. However, this is an area in 
which we will defer to the District Court, which has 
observed Pelullo's demeanor and conduct over the course of 
seven years. 
 
2. Entitlement Defense 
 
At the evidentiary hearing, the government attempted to 
show that Pelullo's entire defense--to each of the three 
discrete schemes that underlay the various counts--was a 
defense of entitlement; that is, Pelullo's response to the 
government's accusation that he had embezzled money was 
that he was entitled to the money. If the government 
succeeded in showing that Pelullo needed to testify about 
each scheme in order to proffer his entitlement defense, 
then it would be clear that the Brady information was 
neither especially useful to Pelullo nor relevant to his 
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decision to testify. The District Court, adopting the 
government's theory, placed great weight on this factor. 
Specifically, it stated: 
 
       I find that the government has established by clear and 
       convincing evidence that Mr. Pelullo waived his fifth 
       amendment privilege and voluntarily agreed to testify 
       at the first trial so that Mr. Pelullo could present a 
       defense to the jury by explaining that he was entitled 
       to use the Royale corporate funds in the manner that 
       he did, and therefore, he did not commit fraud as 
       charged in the indictment. I further find that the Brady 
       material does not and cannot establish or even support 
       the `entitlement' defense Mr. Pelullo sought to establish 
       through his direct testimony. 
 
6 F. Supp. 2d at 412; see also id. at 421. 
 
In response, Pelullo points to trials three and four. If it 
really were necessary for him personally to take the stand 
to present his entitlement defense, Pelullo argues, then he 
would have had to testify in the third and fourth trials. 
Noting that the government's case on Counts 1-53 did not 
materially change throughout the four trials, Pelullo 
submits that his silence in the third and fourth trials shows 
that he had no need to take the stand in his own defense 
once he had the Brady material. 
 
While this is a compelling argument, we cannot hold that 
it was clearly erroneous for the District Court to give weight 
to Pelullo's defense strategy in his first two trials. The 
reason Pelullo did not testify in the third trial was most 
likely a combination of factors: his testimony in the first 
and second trials had not convinced the jury; his attorney 
felt that Pelullo could set forth his entitlement defense well 
enough using just his father's (and others') testimony; and 
the Brady material gave extra support to his defense. That 
is, it is highly probable that Pelullo learned certain things 
about his case as the first two trials played out, and that 
some of that knowledge played a role in his decision not to 
testify at the third trial. While the District Court did not 
make specific findings about Pelullo's defense strategy at 
his third trial, we cannot conclude that it was clearly 
erroneous to give weight to Pelullo's strategy in the first 
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trial, even though that strategy had obviously changed 
slightly by the third trial. 
 
3. Counts 1-53 
 
The District Court found that each count of wire fraud 
would expose Pelullo to five years imprisonment; that 
Scheme One alleged that Pelullo diverted $1.6 million in 
loan proceeds; that Scheme Two alleged that Pelullo 
diverted $471,000 of corporate funds; but that Scheme 
Three (which encompassed Count 54 only) alleged a 
diversion of $114,000. See 6 F. Supp. 2d at 409. The 
District Court also noted that the government had a strong 
case against Pelullo on Counts 1-53; the prosecution 
introduced approximately thirty witnesses, in addition to 
voluminous documentary evidence, to prove Pelullo's guilt 
on those counts. See id. Highlighting the fact that only six 
of Pelullo's 116 pages of direct testimony related to Count 
54, the Court concluded, "[T]he vast majority of Mr. 
Pelullo's testimony was dedicated to providing a defense to 
the heart of the government's case, namely the two 
fraudulent schemes charging Mr. Pelullo with defrauding 
[his companies] of over $2 million." See id. at 411. 
 
In sum, the District Court found that the government 
clearly established that Pelullo had stonewalled Royale's 
accountants to conceal his diversion of corporate funds, 
and that absent an explanation justifying that diversion, 
the jury would easily have returned guilty verdicts on 
Counts 1-53. See id. at 412. In light of this finding, the 
Court concluded that the Brady material would not have 
deterred Pelullo from testifying about his entitlement 
defenses to the weightier charges of diversion in Counts 1- 
53. Therefore, the Court found, Pelullo's testimony at the 
first trial was "obtained by means sufficiently 
distinguishable from the Brady violation to be purged of 
any taint arising from that violation." See id. at 413. The 
Court then inferred that Pelullo, having decided to testify 
about Counts 1-53, knew he would be subject to cross- 
examination about Count 54 and testified about Count 54 
issues on direct examination to diffuse their potency. See 
id. 
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The Court drew support for its conclusion from another 
situation at the first trial. Well into the first trial, one of 
Pelullo's attorneys, Dennis Richard, told the Court that the 
defense would call two more witnesses before it decided 
whether to put Pelullo on the stand. After calling those two 
witnesses, neither of whom testified about anything related 
to the DiSalvo loan or the $114,000 wire transfer, the 
defense decided to call Pelullo as a witness. The District 
Court found that this decision supported the government's 
position that Pelullo would have testified even if the Brady 
material had been disclosed. See id. at 417-18. The Court 
apparently reasoned that the decision whether to call 
Pelullo hung on what those two witnesses managed to 
convey; that the defense knew at that point that those 
witnesses would have nothing to say about the $114,000; 
and that Pelullo had to take the stand to convey additional 
information that the two witnesses had not imparted, 
information unrelated to the DiSalvo loan. See id. at 418. 
While this is not the only inference that the District Court 
could have drawn from these facts, it is a viable inference, 
and thus we cannot find clear error. 
 
4. Whitaker 
 
Although Pelullo did not bear the burden of proving the 
causal connection between the Brady violation and his 
testimony, he nevertheless introduced the testimony of 
Glenn Whitaker, his attorney from the first trial. Whitaker 
testified as follows: 
 
       Q: What were the determining factors in that decis ion 
       to have [Pelullo] testify [at the first trial]? 
 
       W: Well, primarily that we had two F.B.I. agents 
       testifying about a meeting at which Mr. Pelullo was 
       present, and their testimony needed to be rebutted 
       about a particular reference that's contained in this 
       302 [report] . . . . 
 
       Q: Is that the reference that is at Page JA-774, t he last 
       four lines? 
 
       W: Yes. The reference is that a $114,000 wire tran sfer 
       from the debtor-in-possession account to LRP, Inc., 
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       was used to repay Tony DiSalvo. We felt it essential 
       that we call Mr. Pelullo to respond to that, because, 
       quite frankly, there was no other way to deal with that 
       issue. In addition, we felt that we were required to 
       respond to the testimony of Mr. Leonetti about his 
       contacts with Mr. Pelullo, and, again, there was no one 
       else available to deal with that, and there was no 
       effective cross-examination material to deal with those 
       witnesses. 
 
6 F. Supp. 2d at 408. Whitaker further stated that Pelullo 
was put on the stand to deny that he made the statement 
alleged in the 302 report and to deny that he had had 
direct contact with Leonetti. See id. at 408-09. In addition, 
Whitaker noted that he felt that they had "adequate 
defenses and adequate presentation as to the other counts. 
Count 54 was the one [they were] most concerned about." 
See id. at 409. 
 
The Court considered five factors in weighing Whitaker's 
credibility: (i) Whitaker spoke with Pelullo after we 
remanded for an evidentiary hearing; (ii) Whitaker reviewed 
our opinion in Pelullo III; (iii) Whitaker reviewed the Brady 
material before testifying at the evidentiary hearing; (iv) 
Whitaker understood the purpose of the remand hearing; 
and (v) Whitaker testified that the law firm he worked for 
when he represented Pelullo was owed over $100,000 in 
legal fees. See id. at 419. Coupled with the Court's 
incredulity that, counter to Whitaker's testimony, Pelullo 
would not have defended himself against Counts 1-53 in 
person using his entitlement defense, the Court found 
these factors rendered Whitaker's testimony unbelievable. 
However, as Pelullo points out on appeal, most prepared 
witnesses would meet factors (i)-(iv). It is also doubtful that 
Whitaker would feel an obligation to help his oldfirm 
obtain outstanding fees. Had the District Court relied on 
factors (i)-(v) alone in questioning Whitaker's credibility, we 
might well have found clear error. But the District Court 
made further findings about Whitaker that affect the 
calculus. 
 
For instance, Whitaker's closing argument troubled the 
District Court. The Court observed that Whitaker's closing 
at the first trial did not mention the evidence Pelullo now 
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claims was the sole reason he testified. See id. at 416. In 
fact, in closing, Whitaker conceded for the sake of 
argument that the $114,000 may have been used to repay 
DiSalvo, as the government had contended. Whitaker then 
argued that Pelullo was nevertheless entitled to use the 
money for that purpose: 
 
       [L]et's assume that Peter Pelullo used that money to 
       repay Tony DiSalvo. Let's assume that what the 
       Government has said is correct, and we deny it, and 
       the evidence doesn't establish that that happened in 
       any way, shape [or] form. But let's assume he did that. 
       . . . Because again, Peter Pelullo was entitled to the 
       money as compensation and he could use that money 
       any way that he wanted to use it. And if he wanted to 
       use it to repay a debt of his son, if he wanted to use [it] 
       to take to the racetrack . . . whatever it was that he 
       wanted to do with it, it was his business. 
 
Id. at 417. 
 
In the District Court's view, the quoted language called 
into question the asserted reason that Pelullo testified, 
since Whitaker did not mention Pelullo's testimony 
rebutting Leonetti and Wolverton. Second, it illustrated the 
importance of the entitlement defense to Pelullo's case and 
bolstered the District Court's conclusion that Pelullo would 
have testified anyway to set forth that defense. 
 
The District Court was troubled by yet another of 
Whitaker's trial strategies. The Court thought that when 
Pelullo reviewed Wolverton's formal report and saw that the 
report included an "admission" that the $114,000 went to 
pay off DiSalvo, Whitaker should have requested 
Wolverton's rough notes of the interview to see whether 
those notes correlated with the formal report. See id. at 
419. Instead, Whitaker merely filed a pretrial motion asking 
that the rough notes be preserved so that they would be 
available for use at trial. Whitaker did not ask to see the 
rough notes after Wolverton and Leyden testified. 
 
The District Court found a final reason to disbelieve 
Whitaker. It properly noted the "questionable" impeachment 
value of the surveillance logs, see Pelullo III, 105 F.3d at 
123 n.3 (noting that the logs only covered twelve days in 
 
                                19 
  
January), and therefore found unpersuasive Whitaker's 
testimony that having the logs available would have 
influenced Pelullo's decision to testify in thefirst trial. See 
id. at 421. 
 
Pelullo strongly opposes the District Court's (and the 
government's) supposed intimations that Whitaker's 
conduct was less than impeccable and objects to their 
putative slur on his professional reputation. We do not find 
such supposed aspersions to have been made; indeed, it 
appears to us that Whitaker is a highly reputable (and 
capable) lawyer. We also acknowledge the force of Pelullo's 
response to the District Court's (and the government's) 
arguments on this point. However, taking as a whole the 
Court's findings about Whitaker, we cannot conclude that 
it clearly erred in choosing not to credit Whitaker's 
testimony about the reasons Pelullo testified in the first trial.6 
 
5. Ambiguous Testimony at the First Trial 
 
The District Court devoted a number of its findings to a 
comparison between Whitaker's testimony about why 
Pelullo took the stand and what Pelullo actually testified to 
on the stand at the first trial. Finding that Pelullo did not 
testify unambiguously about the things he had purportedly 
planned to testify to, the District Court inferred that 
Whitaker's testimony was not entirely believable and 
appeared to be an "after-the-fact" explanation of why 
Pelullo took the stand. See id. at 414-15. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. The District Court was mistaken when it faulted Whitaker for failing 
to cross-examine Wolverton and Leyden about the content of their notes. 
The Court concluded, "Mr. Whitaker's failure to even broach this subject 
during the cross-examination of Agents Wolverton and Leyden at the first 
trial raises a significant doubt that Mr. Pelullo told Mr. Whitaker before 
the first trial that he had made the statement`repaying intercompany 
debt' during his interview with the agents." See 6 F. Supp. 2d at 420. 
However, as Pelullo points out, Whitaker had nothing with which to 
confront the agents, in light of the Brady violation. Whitaker did cross- 
examine the agents on other issues, but he can hardly be faulted for 
believing he had nothing to cross-examine the agents with on the 
$114,000 question. This fact does not, however, alter our ultimate 
conclusion. 
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Specifically, Whitaker stated that Pelullo wanted to tell 
the jury his version of events; with regard to the FBI 
interview, the Court perceived that version to be a clear 
statement that Pelullo used the $114,000 to "repay 
company debt." But the Court found that Pelullo never 
explicitly offered this explanation. See id. at 415. Instead, 
the Court noted that Pelullo testified at trial, "I said I don't 
remember the $114,000 going to pay Tony DiSalvo, but I do 
have or did have a loan with Tony DiSalvo." See id. The 
Court concluded that the "two versions of what Mr. Pelullo 
supposedly told the FBI agents are irreconcilable." See id. 
 
We disagree. The District Court apparently wanted 
Pelullo to testify verbatim about what he ostensibly told the 
FBI agents, but that was not within its power to require. At 
all events, the two versions are not irreconcilable. The 
District Court ignored the segment of Pelullo's testimony 
that came just before the above-quoted language. In 
response to a question about the circumstances of the 
February wire transfer, Pelullo stated, "That transfer was a 
transfer that I made to authorize to LRP for moneys that 
my dad was owed by the company." Since Pelullo had just 
testified that the February wire transfer went to pay off an 
intercompany debt, it is overly formalistic to require that he 
reiterate that point a few questions later in predetermined 
language. In sum, the District Court clearly erred on this 
set of findings, but this does not render its overall 
conclusion clearly erroneous. 
 
The District Court found similar problems with Pelullo's 
testimony about Leonetti. While acknowledging that Pelullo 
denied meeting Leonetti, the Court noted that Pelullo 
admitted that he had been to Scarfo's house on two 
occasions, and that he did not deny that these visits had 
occurred in January 1986. The Court then faulted Pelullo 
for failing to deny that "he met with Mr. Scarfo and Mr. 
Leonetti on either or both of those occasions." See id. at 
416. But Pelullo had already testified, when asked if 
Leonetti ever contacted him about the DiSalvo loan, that 
Leonetti never had contacted him. Perhaps his lawyer 
should have made sure to ask Pelullo whether he visited 
Scarfo's house in January; it appears that Pelullo did not 
deny that his visits to Scarfo's house were in January 
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because he was never asked when those visits occurred. 
The District Court declared, "It is inconceivable to me 
under these circumstances that Mr. Pelullo would have 
given up his constitutional privilege only for the purpose of 
providing such vague and ambiguous testimony." See id. 
While it would be unfair to require Pelullo to lay out his 
defense in specific words, we do not think the District 
Court erred in inferring that Pelullo would have set forth a 
clearer defense if he truly had decided to testify solely to 
rebut the government's case on Count 54. 
 
6. Testimony in the Second Trial 
 
At his second trial, Pelullo again testified in his own 
defense, setting out his entitlement theory much as he had 
in the first trial. The District Court found that the only 
significant difference between his testimony at the two 
trials was that he did not testify about the $114,000 in the 
second trial. The Court found that this was "powerful and 
compelling evidence that his reason for waiving his fifth 
amendment privilege and testifying at the first trial had 
nothing to do with the information contained in the Brady 
material, because the information contained in the Brady 
material was relevant only to the $114,000 transaction with 
Mr. DiSalvo and was not relevant to the other counts about 
which Mr. Pelullo freely testified." See id. at 413. 
 
Pelullo correctly points out that the District Court had 
(erroneously) ruled at the beginning of the second trial that 
the jury would be instructed that it had to find as a matter 
of law that Pelullo had committed the acts set forth in 
Count 54. Pelullo argues that he had no choice but to take 
the stand in an attempt to mitigate the explosive impact of 
that error, though he fails to explain precisely why he felt 
that taking the stand to discuss Counts 1-53 would 
mitigate the error. Thus, he would have us conclude, the 
trial was so fraught with error that it cannot be used as 
evidence of anything. 
 
However, with regard to trial two, either of two 
assumptions could be correct. While it might be true that 
Pelullo had to get on the stand in order to combat the 
District Court's erroneous use of collateral estoppel, it also 
 
                                22 
  
could be true that taking the stand when Count 54 was not 
in issue indicates that the role of Pelullo's testimony in his 
own defense encompassed more than just a response to 
Count 54. Since either inference is viable, we discern no 
clear error in the District Court's finding. 
 
7. Pelullo's Other Evidence in Defense Against  Count 54 
 
The District Court found that Pelullo had a significant 
amount of evidence that he could use in mounting a 
defense to Count 54. This evidence included his father's 
testimony that Royale owed his company money for the 
hotel renovation project; that the $114,000 transfer in 
February was partial payment of that debt; that he used 
the $114,000 for personal reasons; and that he did not use 
the money to repay DiSalvo on his son's behalf. See id. at 
411. 
 
Beyond refuting the accusations against Pelullo, Pelullo's 
family offered an affirmative explanation for the events at 
issue. See id. His father testified that in August 1986, 
Leonard's brother Arthur told him that Leonard had 
borrowed money from DiSalvo and that Scarfo and Leonetti 
had advised the Pelullos to repay DiSalvo. Leonard's 
brother Peter testified that he helped Leonard repay DiSalvo 
by borrowing money from a bank in September 1986; Peter 
stated that he then gave that money to Arthur to give 
DiSalvo. Leonard introduced bank documents supporting 
this story, including a $55,000 bank check drawn on his 
brother's account, made payable to DiSalvo. The District 
Court did not clearly err in concluding that, based on this 
evidence list, Pelullo could have mounted a defense to 
Count 54 without taking the stand himself. 
 
The Court also found that Pelullo had a number of ways 
to impeach Leonetti's testimony, only one of which was 
taking the stand. As we noted in Pelullo II, "Leonetti was 
subject to extensive cross-examination and impeachment. 
The defense attacked Leonetti's credibility by bringing to 
light the accounts of his murders and his desperate deals 
with the government in order to get out of prison sooner." 
Pelullo II, 14 F.3d at 887. The District Court also found that 
Pelullo, in a motion after the second trial, had described 
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Leonetti's trial testimony as having "minuscule relevance." 
See 6 F. Supp. 2d at 420. From that language, the District 
Court inferred that Leonetti's testimony had little effect on 
Pelullo's decision to waive his Fifth Amendment rights. 
While an alternate reading--that Pelullo simply was 
downplaying to the court the significance of an adverse 
witness's testimony--is possible, the District Court's 
reading is plausible too. 
 
In sum, based on the whole of the District Court's 
findings of fact, we cannot say that the District Court 
clearly erred when it found that the government proved by 
a preponderance of the evidence that Pelullo would have 
testified during his first trial even if the withheld material 
had been made available to him. While the District Court's 
findings of fact were not uniformly correct, we are not left 
with a "definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 
committed." See United States Gypsum, 333 U.S. at 395. 
The judgment of the District Court will be affirmed. 
However, upon return of the mandate to the District Court, 
the Court shall amend the judgment to reflect that the fine 
is a non-committed fine. 
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